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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO
FEDERAL LAWS, PROMULGATED UNDER THE COMMERCE POWER,
WHICH REGULATE STATES. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054
(1983).
Bill Crump, a District Game Division supervisor for the Wyoming
Game and Fish Department, was forced to retire at age fifty-five under
a Wyoming law.1 Crump filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.) alleging that, in retiring him, the
Wyoming Game and Fish Department had violated the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).2 The E.E.O.C. filed suit
against the state of Wyoming seeking declaratory relief, back pay, and
liquidated damages on behalf of Mr. Crump and others similarly situ-
ated. The district court dismissed the suit upon a motion by the defen-
dant, holding that the ADEA, as applied to the states, violated the
tenth amendment.- The E.E.O.C. then filed a direct appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.
The issues before the Court was whether the ADEA as applied to
the states was precluded by the tenth amendment restraint on Con-
gress' Commerce Clause power. The Court found that ADEA did not
"'directly impair' the State's ability to 'structure integral operations in
areas of traditional government functions,' "" a factor which must be
present for a successful tenth amendment challenge. The Court held
that the extension of the ADEA to cover the states was a valid exercise
of Congress' Commerce Clause authority and therefore reversed the
judgment of the district court. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054
(1983).
The tenth amendment states simply, "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
1. Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Retirement Act, WYO.
STAT. § 31-3-107 (1977), provides that once a covered employee reaches age fifty-five he may
continue in his job only with the approval of his employer. The Act also provides for mandatory
retirement of all covered employees who reach age sixty-five.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. 11 1983), makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against any employee between the ages of forty and seventy on the basis of age,
except where age is a "bona fide occupational qualification" reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business.
3. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981).
4. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1062 (1983).
449
UALR LAW JOURNAL
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 5 The
Commerce Clause gives Congress the power "[to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the In-
dian Tribes."' These two brief statements have generated much litiga-
tion and discussion as scholars and courts have disagreed concerning
the balance between the two provisions.' The federal judiciary has con-
tinually monitored the expansion of congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause and since the late 1930s, the courts have even up-
held congressional regulation of primarily local activities if the activi-
ties have an economic impact on more than one state.8
In the early part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
viewed the tenth amendment's reservation of powers to the states as
placing a limit on the reach of Congress' commerce power. The 1918
case of Hammer v. Dagenhart9 is representative of the Court's ap-
proach. The Court in Hammer held unconstitutional a law prohibiting
the interstate transportation of goods produced through child labor.10
The majority opinion stated that sustaining the law "would sanction an
invasion by the Federal power of the control of a matter purely local in
its character, and over which no authority had been delegated to Con-
gress in conferring the power to regulate commerce among the
states."" The Court during that period attempted to distinguish local
matters, such as manufacturing, from the national matter of com-
merce. " However, even during that period, the Court recognized the
supremacy of federal law over areas recognized as legitimately affect-
ing interstate commerce. In Sanitary District of Chicago v. United
States,13 a city agency was enjoined from diverting water from a lake
in excess of the amount authorized by the Secretary of War, the Court
stating that "this power [of the United States to remove obstructions to
interstate commerce] is superior to that of the states to provide for the
5. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. See, e.g., Comment, Redefining the National League of Cities State Sovereignty Doctrine,
129 PA. L. REV. 1460 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Redefining); Lopach, The New Federalism of
the Supreme Court: Diminished Expectations of National League of Cities, 43 MONT. L. REV.
181 (1982); Mosk, Rediscovering the l0th Amendment, 20 JUDGES J. No. 4, 16 (1981).
8. Redefining, supra note 7, at 1460.
9. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
10. Act of Sept. 1, 1916, 39 Stat. 675, c. 432 (Comp. St. 1916).
11. 247 U.S. at 276.
12. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer, 247 U.S. 251; Nagel,
Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT.
REV. 81, 98.
13. 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
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welfare or necessities of their inhabitants."' 4
As the following cases indicate, the Court initially refused to dis-
tinguish, for the purpose of determining the validity of Commerce
Clause legislation, between state governmental and private commercial
activity, at least where the state was performing a function normally
done by the private sector. 15 The first major case testing the constitu-
tionality of a congressional commerce power regulation of a state activ-
ity was United States v. California."6 California had challenged the
application of the Federal Safety Appliance Act of 1893'" to a state-
owned railroad. The Court, in holding that the Act was constitutionally
applied to a state, declared that "[t]he sovereign power of the states is
necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the fed-
eral government in the Constitution."' 8 To emphasize its holding that a
state-owned railroad stood on the same footing as any other railroad
with regard to Congressional regulation, the Court stated that "[t]he
state can no more deny the power [to regulate commerce] if its exercise
has been authorized by Congress than can an individual."' 9 The Court
in subsequent cases consistently held that federal Commerce Clause
regulations constitutionally could be applied to both state-owned and
privately operated railroads.2 0 In answer to a state's assertion that the
tenth amendment prevented the application of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act2 to a state-owned railroad, the Court replied that "the
States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted
Congress the power to regulate commerce."22 The Court stated that
"when a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters
into activities subject to congressional regulation [i.e., operation of a
railroad], it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a
private person or corporation. 23
By the late 1930s, the tide had begun to turn from the restrictive
view of interstate commerce expressed in cases such as Hammer. In
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,4 the Court upheld a National
14. Id. at 426.
15. Redefining, supra note 7, at 1464.
16. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
17. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
18. 297 U.S. at 184.
19. Id. at 185.
20. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Cali-
fornia v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
21. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
22. 377 U.S. at 191.
23. Id. at 196.
24. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Labor Relations Board ruling that Jones & Laughlin had engaged in
unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act
of 19355 by discriminating against and intimidating union members.
The Court stated that "[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in char-
acter when separately considered, if they have such a close and sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control." '26 The
Court rationalized that Congress could regulate labor relations at any
manufacturing plant selling its products across state lines because a
work stoppage at any such plant "would have a most serious effect
upon interstate commerce. "27
In United States v. Darby28 the Court specifically overruled Ham-
mer and held that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 9
which prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by employ-
ees whose wages and hours did not conform to stated minimums, was a
valid exercise of the commerce power. Darby was a major departure
from prior case law which had classified manufacturing as a "local"
activity not subject to federal regulation. In dismissing the state sover-
eignty challenge to the FLSA, the Court stated:
The [tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adop-
tion to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship
between the national and state governments as it had been established
by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was
other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek
to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able
to exercise fully their reserved powers.30
Darby ended at least for a time the tenth amendment's use as an inde-
pendent limitation on the commerce power.3 1
The FLSA was amended in 19662 to cover employees of state and
local nursing homes, hospitals, and educational institutions. Twenty-
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
26. 301 U.S. at 37.
27. Id. at 41.
28. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982) sets the minimum wage workers must be paid and requires
one-and-one-half times the worker's regular wage to be paid for each hour over 40 he works per
week.
30. 312 U.S. at 124.
31. Redefining, supra note 7, at 1464.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982).
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eight states joined together in Maryland v. Wirtz" and challenged the
application of the Act to states as unconstitutional because of the tenth
amendment. In ruling that the amendments to the FLSA were consti-
tutional, the Court stated, "If a State is engaging in economic activities
that are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in
by private persons [as settled in Darby], the State too may be forced to
conform its activities to federal regulation."'" The Court declared it
would not "carve up the commerce power to protect enterprises indis-
tinguishable in their effect on commerce from private businesses, sim-
ply because those enterprises happen to be run by the States for the
benefit of their citizens."35 The Court noted that the extension of the
FLSA to hospital and educational employees was justified because of
the significant impact they exert on interstate commerce due to the
large amount of interstate supplies they receive. 6
The FLSA was amended in 1974 3 to apply to virtually all state
employees. In the trend-bucking and much criticized 8 case of National
League of Cities v. Usery,39 the Court overruled Wirtz and held that
the extension of the FLSA to the states was an unconstitutional viola-
tion of the tenth amendment. The Court stated that "States as States
stand on a quite different footing from an individual or a corporation
when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate com-
merce" 40- a rather different view than that taken in previous cases.' 1
The FLSA unconstitutionally infringed on the tenth amendment guar-
antee of state sovereignty because "[o]ne undoubted attribute of state
sovereignty is the States' power to determine the wages which shall be
paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their governmen-
tal functions, what hours those persons will work, and what compensa-
tion will be provided where these employees may be called upon to
33. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
34. Id. at 197.
35. Id. at 198-99.
36. Id. at 194.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1982).
38. See, e.g., Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirm-
ative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1066 (1977); Michelman,
States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 38 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166 (1977); Nagel, supra note 12, at 82 (lists several other articles
which have criticized National League of Cities).
39. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
40. Id. at 854.
41. See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 199; Parden, 377 U.S. at 197; United States v. California, 297
U.S. at 185.
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work overtime. ' 4 2 The Court thus held that requiring the states to con-
form to the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the FLSA
would "impermissibly interfere with the integral government func-
tions" 43 of the states and struck down the amendment. The Court noted
that the FLSA would have had both a financial impact, that of in-
creased labor costs, and a policy-making impact, that of forcing states
to cut public services or raise taxes to compensate for the increased
labor costs.44
The Court's decision was vague concerning treatment of future
federal laws affecting states. The Court implied that a direct/indirect
test would be used to determine whether Congress had violated the
tenth amendment - i.e., Congress could not use the commerce power
"to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential deci-
sions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions [were]
to be made."'45 Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, suggested
that a balancing approach between state and federal needs should be
taken in deciding whether a federal law violated the tenth amend-
ment.46 Cases and commentators reviewing National League of Cities
have considered both the direct/indirect and the balancing tests in
reaching their conclusions.47
National League of Cities was interpreted, refined, and narrowed
in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association.8
In rejecting a tenth amendment challenge to the Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act of 1977,'4 the Court set out a three-pronged
test which must be met for a successful tenth amendment challenge to
a federal law promulgated under the commerce power. The law must
(1) regulate the "States as States," (2) address the matters that are
indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty," and (3) directly impair
the state's ability to "structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions. '50 However, even if all three parts of
this test are met, a tenth amendment challenge is not guaranteed to
42. 426 U.S. at 845.
43. Id. at 851.
44. Id. at 846-47.
45. Id. at 855.
46. Id. at 856.
47. See, e.g., Weissman, United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road: National
League of Cities Derailed?. 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 189, 205 (1981); Note, The Unconstitutionality
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 17 TUILSA L.J. 782, 786-87 (1982).
48. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
49. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
50. 452 U.S. at 287-88.
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succeed. For even if the test is met, "[t] here are situations in which the
nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies
state submission. '  Thus, while relying on National League of Cities
to reach its decision, the Court's statements in Hodel tend to indicate
that National League of Cities was limited to its facts, or those very
similar, and was not a signal that the commerce power was being
greatly restricted as in the days of Hammer.5'
The Court had further opportunity to interpret and limit National
League of Cities in United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail-
road Co.53 The Court was faced with the question of whether the Rail-
way Labor Act (RLA)," which permitted strikes as a last resort tactic
for settling disputes, or the Taylor Law,55 a New York act which pro-
hibited strikes by public employees, applied to a state-owned railroad.
The Court held the Railway Labor Act controlling and turned back the
argument that it came under a tenth amendment-restriction to the
commerce power.5 6 The Court found that the RLA failed to meet the
third prong of the Hodel test since "operation of a railroad engaged in
interstate commerce is not an integral part of traditional state activities
generally immune from federal regulation. '57  The cases discussed
above indicate that because of the ambiguities of National League of
Cities and the far reaching impact a liberal construction of it would
have on Congress' commerce power, the few courts interpreting Na-
tional League of Cities have been unwilling to use it as a basis for
invalidating other commerce power legislation which has a different
impact on state sovereignty than the FLSA.58
E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming was not the first challenge to state and local
mandatory retirement laws or to the ADEA.59 The Court in E.E.O.C.
51. Id. at 288 n.29.
52. See, e.g., Weissman, supra note 47, at 199; Note, Constitutional Challenges to the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 43 MONT. L. REv. 235, 242 (1982).
53. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
54. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1976 and Supp. V 1981).
55. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 and Supp. 1980-1981).
56. 455 U.S. at 688.
57. Id. at 685.
58. Note, The Constitutionality of the ADEA After Usery, 30 ARK. L. Rav. 363, 370 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ADEA After Usery].
59. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), is an example. The
Court in Murgia held that a state law providing for the mandatory retirement of uniformed police
officers at age fifty [MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32 § 26(3)(a)(1969)], was not a violation of equal
protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The Court noted that while the aged may
have been subject to some discrimination, they did not constitute a suspect class for the purpose of
equal protection analysis. It must be noted that the ADEA did not apply to the states when
Murgia was litigated; therefore, the Massachusetts law was not challenged as a violation of the
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v. Wyoming noted that lower courts which had passed on the constitu-
tionality of the ADEA as applied to state and local governments had
upheld the Act.60 In Usery v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City,61
the district court reasoned that National League of Cities required a
balancing of state and federal interests and that the national interest in
preventing age discrimination was "particularly significant when bal-
anced against the defendant's nominal interest in arbitrarily discrimi-
nating in its employment decisions on the basis of age."'62 In a case
from Arkansas, Aaron v. Davis,63 the district court struck down a city
ordinance setting mandatory retirement for fireman at age sixty-two.
The court stated:
[Alithough the Age Discrimination [in Employment] Act does alter
the state's ability to structure employer-employee relationships by for-
bidding the states to discriminate between employees on the basis of
age, that alteration does not significantly interfere with the policy
choices of the state's elected officials and administrators as to how
best to allocate the state's financial resources in discharging the state's
primary function (within the framework of the Constitution) of ad-
ministering the public law and maintaining the public health and
welfare.64
Justice Brennan, in delivering the opinion of the Court in E.E.O.C.
v. Wyoming, noted the strong evidence brought before the Congress
that age discrimination does exist and is harmful to both the nation's
economy and to the older worker's well-being65 and recognized the
valid federal interest in passing the ADEA. In ruling that the ADEA
could be constitutionally applied to the states, the Court cited National
League of Cities and Hodel throughout its opinion and attempted to
distinguish E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming from National League of Cities.
However, similarities between the cases also existed, considering that
the ADEA is integrated with FLSA enforcement provisions, the ADEA
and FLSA are similarly rooted in the Commerce Clause, and the provi-
sions of both Acts were extended to the states by the same 1974
amendments. 66
Whether a federal law impermissibly directly impairs a state's soV-
ADEA and no tenth amendment challenge to the commerce power was raised.
60. 103 S. Ct. at 1059 n.6.
61. 421 F. Supp. 718 (C.D. Utah 1976).
62. Id. at 720.
63. 424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
64. Id. at 1241.
65. 103 S. Ct. at 1057-58.
66. ADEA After Usery, supra note 58, at 363.
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ereignty depends on the magnitude of the intrusion. The Court found
that, since the degree of intrusion in E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming was signifi-
cantly less than in National League of Cities, Congress' regulation was
a permissible exercise of the commerce power.67 The Court also distin-
guished National League of Cities by noting that compliance with the
Fair Labor Standards Act would have had a tremendous financial im-
pact on the states while the effect of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act on a state's finances was debatable.6 8 The dissenting
opinion in this five to four decision disagreed with that assumption,
claiming that compliance with the Act would have a noticeable finan-
cial impact. 9
The Court used the three-pronged test set out in Hodel to deter-
mine whether the ADEA was an unconstitutional intrusion into state
sovereignty protected by the tenth amendment.70 The decision conceded
that the ADEA regulates the "States as States" and it assumed, for the
purpose of this case, that the Act addresses an "undoubted attribute to
state sovereignty." '71 However, the Court found the ADEA did not "di-
rectly impair the state's ability to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional government functions. 17  The Court reached this conclu-
sion by finding that the state's purpose in passing the mandatory retire-
ment law - assuring the physical preparedness of its game wardens to
perform their duties - could still be met within the framework of the
ADEA.7 8 The state could still force its game wardens to retire before
age seventy on an individual basis if it could be shown that age was a
"bona fide occupational qualification." 4 The first dissenting opinion,
67. 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
68. Id. at 1063.
69. Id. at 1070. The Chief Justice, with whom Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor
joined, stated:
It is beyond dispute that the statute can give rise to increased employment costs caused
by forced employment of older individuals. Since those employees tend to be at the
upper end of the pay scale, the cost of their wages while they are still in the work force
is greater. And since most pension plans calculate retirement benefits on the basis of
maximum salary or number of years of service, pension costs are greater when an older
employee retires. The employer is also forced to pay more for insuring the health of
older employees because, as a group, they inevitably carry a higher-than-average risk of
illnesses. [Citations omitted] Since they are - especially in law enforcement - also
more prone to on-the-job injuries, it is reasonable to conclude that the employer's disa-
bility costs are increased.
Id.
70. 103 S. Ct. at 1061.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1062.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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per Justice Burger, found that the ADEA met the third prong of the
Hodel test. The Chief Justice concluded that the Act would have a
substantial financial impact on the states, since older workers are gen-
erally paid more due to job seniority,7 5 and a policy impact, since pro-
motions of qualified younger workers would be slowed because the
older workers generally hold more responsible jobs.76
The Court thus found the application of the ADEA to the states a
constitutional extension of the federal commerce power. As long as the
state could justify the early retirement of one of its workers, no intru-
sion into its sovereignty would result; but if the state could not justify
the early retirement of a worker, the intrusion into this area of its sov-
ereignty would be allowable to satisfy a larger national goal." The
Chief Justice's dissent, however, denied that the retiring of unfit older
workers on an individual basis was effective in actual practice because
of the high standards for proving a "bona fide occupational
qualification. '7 8
E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming is significant because of the way it fits into
the trends of cases bringing tenth amendment challenges to federal acts
regulating the states, promulgated under the commerce power. Cases
prior to 1976 bringing tenth amendment challenges to the commerce
power were consistently resolved in favor of the commerce power. This
trend continued in a fairly uniform direction until National League of
Cities v. Usery.
In National League of Cities, for the first time in four decades,
the Court held a congressional regulation of interstate commerce un-
constitutional. Instead of following the previous line of cases, the Su-
preme Court abruptly overruled one of its cases, ruled the opposite way
from its previous trend, and held that the tenth amendment restricted
the application of a federal act promulgated under the commerce
power to the states. National League of Cities could thus be viewed as
arresting the growth of the commerce power, but its effect on later
cases was unclear.
Even while it relies largely on National League of Cities in reach-
ing its result, E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming holds similarly to the earlier line of
cases in allowing the federal commerce power to prevail over a state
sovereignty challenge. As did Hodel and other succeeding cases,
E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming serves to limit and narrow the result of National
75. Id. at 1070.
76. Id. at 1071.
77. See id. at 1062.
78. Id. at 1071.
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League of Cities. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming indicates to courts looking at
tenth amendment challenges to the Commerce Clause in the future
that the pendulum has not necessarily swung back to upholding the
challenges.
E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming is significant in its own right in that more
than half the states, plus many local governments, have mandatory re-
tirement laws that conflict with the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. 79 An Arkansas law provides for the mandatory retirement of po-
lice officers at age sixty-five. 80 If challenged under the ADEA, the Ar-
kansas law would almost certainly be struck down. The practical im-
pact might be limited, however, since the physical fitness required to be
a police officer might be grounds for retiring many individual officers as
a "bona fide occupational qualification." However, as was brought out
in the dissent in E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, it is often very difficult to prove
that age is a "bona fide occupational qualification." The character of
our work force may very well change to include a much larger compo-
nent of older workers because of this decision.
Gail Ponder
79. Id. at 1069 n.2.
80. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-455 (1977).
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